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INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 2012, Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX)
became the first commercial company to dock with the Interna-
tional Space Station.' This achievement marked a milestone in
the company's $278 million Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services contract with the National Aeronautic and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA).2 Five months later, SpaceX again docked
with the International Space Station, this time completing the
first of twelve resupply missions contracted for under a separate
$1.6 billion Commercial Resupply Services agreement.3
SpaceX is not without competitors in the race for lucrative
NASA contracts. Sierra Nevada Corporation, Blue Origin LLC,
Boeing Company, and Orbital Sciences Corporation have all re-
cently received NASA contracts.4 In a market characterized by
high barriers to entry and limited resources, receiving NASA
1 Trent J. Perrotto & Josh Byerly, SpaceX Dragon Attached to Space Station in
Spaceflight First, NASA (May 25, 2012), http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/
2012/may/HQ_12-172-SpaceX..DragonBerth.html.
2 SpaceX Readies for Second Flight to the International Space Station, SPACEX (Aug.
23, 2012), http://www.spacex.com/news/2013/02/08/spacex-readies-second-
flight-international-space-station; Doug Messier, NASA Commercial Crew and Cargo
Awards Approaching $1 Billion, PARABOLIc ARc (Apr. 25, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://
www.parabolicarc.com/2011/04/25/nasa-commercial-crew-cargo-award-commit-
1-billion/.
3 See Trent J. Perrotto & Josh Byerly, First Contracted SpaceX Resupply Mission
Launches with NASA Cargo to Space Station, NASA (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nasa.
gov/home/hqnews/2012/oct/HQ12-355_SpaceXCRS-1_Launch.html.
4 See Emi Kolawole, NASA Awards Multimillion-Dollar Contracts to Boeing SpaceX




Center: Contracts, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/news/contracts/
(last updated Sept. 16, 2013).
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contracts can prove critical for a company's space program.' In
addition to financial barriers, the commercial space industry
must overcome unique hurdles in the procurement and en-
forcement of intellectual property rights.
A considerable amount of commentary addresses the inter-
play of international treaties and the extraterritorial enforce-
ment of patent rights in space.6 But few observers have
considered the role NASA plays in the commercialization of
space technology. When companies contract with NASA, they
subject themselves to a range of intellectual property issues. One
driving force behind these issues is the dichotomy between the
traditional patent grant and NASA's policy to encourage the ful-
lest commercial use of space.
To understand how NASA affects the commercialization of
space, this comment analyzes the patent clauses that NASA uses
when contracting with commercial companies. Agreements with
NASA affect a company's ability to choose its own intellectual
property protections, obtain and license patents, build a patent
portfolio, and assert its own patent rights. Furthermore, the gov-
erning framework of NASA contracts will soon transition from
the 1952 Patent Act to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(AIA). Significant changes to the U.S. patent system, including
inventors' rights, geographic limitations on prior art, and inven-
tion disclosure rules, all necessitate a review of NASA's current
contractual patent clauses. NASA contracts, their statutory basis,
and the policies they affect all influence the commercialization
of space.
Part I of this comment analyzes the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958 (Space Act) as it pertains to NASA's "other
transaction" authority. The evolving policy justifications for the
Space Act explain NASA's use of its other transaction authority
and its use of invention waiver. Part II reviews the sample patent
clauses that NASA uses when contracting with private industry.
Many NASA agreements made under the 1952 Patent Act con-
5 Lee Roop, NASA Praises Commercial Space Partners as Federal Budget Battles Near,
AL.com (Jan. 9, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://blog.al.com/breaking/2013/01/nasa
praisesscommercial-space.html.
6 See, e.g., Leo B. Malagar & Marlo Apalisok Magdoza-Malagar, International
Law of Outer Space and the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J.
311 (1999); Theodore U. Ro et al., Patent Infjingement in Outer Space in Light of 35
U.S. C. § 105: Following the White Rabbit Down the Rabbit Loophole, 17 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 202 (2011) (explaining the "flag of convenience" loophole that makes
enforcing space patents difficult).
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tinue under the AIA; therefore, Part II analyzes the effect of the
AIA on previously contracted-for patent rights. Part III analyzes
recent contracts made between NASA and commercial space
companies to assess the negotiability of NASA's sample patent
provisions. Finally, Part IV addresses the broader intellectual
property issues at stake when companies contract with NASA.
I. THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT
OF 1958
In the fall of 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, mark-
ing the beginning of the Cold War's space race.7 To close the
perceived technological gap between the Soviets and the United
States, Congress passed the Space Act.' The Space Act created
NASA to "research into problems of flight within and outside
the [E]arth's atmosphere." In 1984, Congress updated NASA's
policy objectives to "seek and encourage, to the maximum ex-
tent possible, the fullest commercial use of space."1o
To achieve its policy directives, NASA has the authority "to
enter into and perform such contracts, leases, cooperative
agreements, or other transactions as may be necessary in the
conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem appropri-
ate, with any . .. person, firm, association, corporation, or edu-
cational institution."" Notably, while many government
agencies enjoy the ability to enter into contracts, joint agree-
ments, and leases, only a few receive "other transaction author-
ity."l2 Contracts created under NASA's other transaction
authority are known as Space Act Agreements (SAAs).
7 Steve Garber, Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, NASA, www.history.
nasa.gov/sputnik (last updated Oct. 10, 2007).
8 See id.
9 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 51 U.S.C. §§ 10101-71302
(2006).
10 See National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 98-361, § 110, 98 Stat. 422, 426 (codified as amended at 51
U.S.C. § 20102).
11 51 U.S.C. § 20113(e) (2006).
12 Besides NASA, only a select few other agencies have other transaction au-
thority, including the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, and the Department of Transportation. See David S.
Schuman, Space Act Agreements: A Practitioner's Guide, 34 J. SPACE L. 277, 279 n.8
(2008).
13 See NASA, POLICY DIRECTIVE 1050.11, AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO SPACE ACT
AGREEMENTS (Dec. 23, 2008).
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To appreciate the power and flexibility of SAAs, it is helpful to
understand what these agreements are not. Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FARs) cover government procurement contracts,
grants, and cooperative agreements." The FAR System creates a
set of regulations and policies that executive agencies must fol-
low when soliciting, awarding, and administering government
contracts.1 5 Parties alleging a violation of an acquisition regula-
tion may file a grievance with the Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) Comptroller General.' 6 Once a claim is filed,
the contracting agency may not award the procurement contract
until the dispute is resolved."
The Comptroller General recently ruled on whether FARs ap-
ply to SAAs." In early 2006, NASA began accepting proposals
for the Commercial Crew/Cargo Project.'9 After receiving pro-
posals, NASA invited six firms to the negotiations phase of the
bid.2 0 Exploration Partners, LLC was not one of the six.2 ' Subse-
quently, Exploration Partners filed a protest with the Comptrol-
ler General alleging violations of federal procurement statutes.2 2
In response to Exploration Partners' protest, NASA argued
that SAAs made under its other transaction authority are not
procurement contracts and therefore are not subject to FAR
and GAO bid-protest review. The Comptroller sided with
NASA, finding it persuasive that Congress had delegated "broad
authority" to NASA and that Congress had differentiated be-
tween "contracts" and "other transaction authority."2 4 Going for-
ward, the Comptroller will only review NASA's bid process to
14 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.104, 2.101 (2012).
15 Id. § 1.101; see Surya Gablin Gunasekara, Other Transaction Authority, 40 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 893, 896 (2011).
16 31 U.S.C. § 3552 (2006).
17 Id. § 3553(c) (1). But see id. § 3553(c) (2) (allowing an exception if there are
compelling circumstances that affect the government's interests).
18 See Exploration Partners, LLC, B-298804, 2006 WL 3734150, at *1 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 19, 2006).
19 NASA, ANNOUNCEMENT No. COTS-01-05, COMMERCIAL ORBITAL TRANSPORTA-
TION SERVICES (2006) (on file with NASA).
20 See Exploration Partners, LLC, 2006 WL 3734150, at *2.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See id. The Comptroller had previously ruled that it would likely not review
the award of cooperative agreements or other nonprocurement instruments. See
id.; see also Sprint Commc'ns Co., L.P., B-256586, 1994 WL 190255, at *1 (Comp.
Gen. May 9, 1994).
24 See Exploration Partners, LLC, 2006 WL 3734150, at *2-3.
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ascertain whether NASA is using SAAs to avoid the requirements
of procurement statutes and regulations.
A second distinction between SAAs and procurement con-
tracts is the applicability of the Bayh-Dole University and Small
Business Patent Procedures Act (Bayh-Dole Act) .2' The Bayh-
Dole Act promotes the utilization of federally funded inventions
by allowing small businesses, nonprofits, and universities to re-
tain title to inventions created under government-funded con-
tracts. 27 The Bayh-Dole Act extends not only to procurement
contracts but also to grants and cooperative agreements.2 8 Addi-
tionally, the Bayh-Dole Act takes precedence over other acts that
may allocate rights in a different manner, ostensibly including
NASA's title-taking authority. 29
Notwithstanding the Bayh-Dole Act's broad applicability,
NASA made the administrative decision that, because SAAs fall
under NASA's "other transaction" authority, SAAs are outside
the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act.s0 This distinction is especially
important for small businesses and universities that contract
with NASA because these entities are accustomed to the protec-
tions of Bayh-Dole.
Despite the controversial power of SAAs, NASA Attor-
ney-Advisor David Schuman reports that "[i]t would be no ex-
aggeration to state that since the [other transaction] authority
was enacted, NASA lawyers have used it to help our clients
achieve their mission thousands of times."3 1 In fact, NASA enters
into roughly 250 SAAs every year. While SAAs are desirable for
their flexibility, the absence of a standard one-size-fits-all SAA
creates administrative headaches." To overcome this obstacle,
25 Id. at *3.
26 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2006).
27 Id. §§ 200, 202.
28 See id. § 201 (b) (defining the term "funding agreement").
29 See id. § 210(a) (7); see also 51 U.S.C. § 20135(b) (2006).
3o See NASA, ADVISORY IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTION NAII 1050-11, SPACE ACT
AGREEMENTS GUIDE 41 n.68 (2011) [hereinafter SAA GUIDE] ("SAAs, which are
entered into under NASA's 'other transaction' authority, are not Bayh-Dole fund-
ing agreements, and the Bayh-Dole Act does not apply."); see also Richard N.
Kuyath, Barriers to Federal Procurement: Patent Rights, 36 PROCUREMENT L. 1, 17 (ex-
plaining that other transaction authority agencies, such as NASA and the Depart-
ment of Transportation, are exempt from the Bayh-Dole Act).
31 Schuman, supra note 12, at 278.
32 The NASA Space Act Agreement: Partnering with NASA, NASA (Apr. 7, 2010),
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/440942mainSpace%2OAct.pdf.
3 See Schuman, supra note 12, at 279-81.
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NASA relies on several procedures to create consistency from
one SAA to another."
First, NASA publishes the Space Act Agreements Guide. 5
This Guide cross-references NASA's policy directives, procedu-
ral requirements, and advisory implementing instructions that
set the foundation for the SAA provisions.3 6 Second, NASA cre-
ates its SAAs using a program called the Space Act Agreement
Maker (SAAM) .3 Based on relevant factual information, the
SAAM creates a first-draft SAA." Understanding the potential
clauses that the SAAM may generate is important because they
affect a broad array of rights.
II. SPACE ACT AGREEMENT PATENT CLAUSES
SAAs cover a range of intellectual property issues that may
arise during the term of the agreement. NASA relies on three
distinct patent clauses to allocate rights while several factors de-
termine which clause applies. If the work is for NASA, the SAA
will contain the Title Taking Sample Clause." If the work is not
for NASA, NASA will look at the likelihood that inventive activity
will take place and use either the Short Form or Long Form
Sample Clause.40 Determining which clause applies will signifi-
cantly affect the contracting party's patent rights. 4'
Substantive changes to patent law warrant close inspection of
each patent clause. Notably, patent rights contracted for under
the 1952 Patent Act will take on different meanings under the
AIA.12 Thus, it is important for the SAA partner to understand
not only its past rights but also its new rights under the AIA.
SAAs also contain provisions not typically seen in FAR contracts.
As a result, SAA partners should not assume that NASA retains
34 See generally id. at 281-83.
3 See id. at 282-83. NASA's Office of the General Counsel oversees the imple-
mentation and maintenance of the SAA program. Id. at 282.
36 SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 1.
3 Schuman, supra note 12, at 281.
38 Id.
See 51 U.S.C. § 20135(b) (2006) (defining when inventions become the ex-
clusive property of NASA); see also SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 39-43 (differenti-
ating the various patent clauses).
40 See SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 42.
41 Id. at 40-43.
42 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-37) (implementation of the AIA
provisions will take place at various times between September 16, 2011, and
March 16, 2013).
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the standard contractual provisions. With these concerns in
mind, the remainder of Part II will analyze the relevant provi-
sions of each patent clause.
A. THE SHORT FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE
NASA uses the Short Form Sample Clause when the work per-
formed is not for NASA and there is a low chance of inventive
activity taking place. 3 These SAAs typically cover nontechnical
community outreach and educational ventures." For instance,
the NASA HUNCH Program, an innovative program in which
high school students apply their math and science skills to fabri-
cate real-world products for NASA, utilizes the Short Form Sam-
ple Clause. 45 For many of these educational programs, NASA
simply provides a fill-in-the-blank SAA form for the interested
party to sign. 6
In the rare circumstance where inventive activity occurs, the
Short Form Sample Clause states:
[T]itle to inventions made (conceived or first actually reduced to
practice) under this Agreement remain with the respective in-
venting party(ies). No invention or patent rights are exchanged
or granted under this Agreement. . . . The Parties will consult
and agree on the responsibilities and actions to establish and
maintain patent protection for joint invention[s] . . ..
Due to the nature of this SAA, parties will likely enter into the
agreement with little legal guidance. Confusion may arise as to
the actual rights received for patents created under the Short
Form Sample Clause. Changes implemented by the AIA may
also create confusion as to the rights granted by the Short Form.
43 SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 42.
44 See id. at 42 n.70.
45 See generally NASA HUNCH PROGRAM, http://nasahunch.com (last visited
June 9, 2013).
46 Compare Space Act Agreement Form, NASA HUNCH PROGRAM, http://
nasahunch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Space-Act-Agreement-blank.doc
(last visited June 9, 2013), with SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 80-81.
47 NASA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-INVENTION AND PATENT RIGHTS
(SHORT FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE) 1 2, in SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 80-81 [here-
inafter SHORT FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE].
48 For instance, a school district's superintendent may sign the HUNCH SAA.




On March 16, 2013, under the AIA, the United States
switched from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file patent system.4 9
This critical change to U.S. patent law affected how and when
an inventor qualifies for patent protection. 0 Prior to March 16,
2013, a right to patent protection was based on invention con-
ception, provided the inventor then diligently reduced the in-
vention to practice.5 ' In situations where an inventor was the
first to conceive but the second to file an application, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) provided interference
proceedings to determine priority of inventorship.52 The lan-
guage used in the Short Form Sample Clause, "conceived or first
actually reduced to practice," reflects this application of the
law.5
Since March 16, 2013, priority of invention no longer vests
with the first inventor to conceive or reduce an invention to
practice but rather with the first inventor to file.54 In other
words, the right to patent protection will go to the first inventor
to file even if she is the second inventor to conceive.5 5 In fur-
therance of this change, the AIA replaced interference proceed-
ings with derivation proceedings.5 ' Under a first-to-file system,
an inventor is limited to arguing that a senior filer derived his
invention from the junior-filing inventor.57
With these changes in mind, parties to the Short Form Sam-
ple Clause should be cognizant that since March 16, 2013, even
though they may be the first to conceive of an invention, they
have not obtained title to any patent rights. Rather, the contrac-
49 See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
50 See id.
51 See Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ex-
plaining that priority of invention goes to the party that can show the earliest
date of conception with reasonable diligence in reducing that idea to practice).
52 See 1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006) (defining interference proceed-
ings); see also id. § 102(g) (1) (establishing that a person is not entitled to patent
protection if during the course of an interference proceeding another inventor
can prove that her invention was made prior).
53 See SHORT FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 47, 1 2.
54 See AIA § 3.
55 See DONALD S. CHISUM, PRIORITY AMONG COMPETING PATENT APPLICANTS
UNDER THE AMERICAN INVENTS ACT (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1969592.
56 See AIA § 3(i) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 135) (replacing the current
section on interference proceedings with a discussion of derivation proceedings).
57 Id. § 3(h) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 291).
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tual provisions of the Short Form Sample Clause merely give the
inventive party the right to file a patent application.
B. THE LONG FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE
NASA relies on the Long Form Sample Clause when the work
to be done is not for NASA, but there is more than a minimal
chance that work under the SAA will lead to an invention. 8 In
contrast to the Short Form, the Long Form relies on seven provi-
sions to cover a range of potential inventive activity." These pro-
visions outline the parties' licensing, sublicensing, assignment,
and patent rights to solely and jointly made inventions.o
1. Inventions Made by NASA and Its Related Entities
Under provisions 2 and 3 of the Long Form, NASA will use
"reasonable efforts" to grant a negotiated license to the SAA
partner, subject to 37 C.F.R. § 404, for any invention made by
NASA or one of its related entities." According to Part 404, the
SAA partner must provide a plan for developing or marketing
the invention and show that it has the capabilities to carry out
the plan.6 2 To help facilitate licensing, NASA lists all licensable
inventions on its website."
2. Partner's Patent Rights to Joint Inventions
For inventions jointly created by NASA and the SAA partner,
provision 4 of the Long Form Sample Clause requires that "rea-
sonable efforts [be made] to report, and cooperate in obtaining
patent protection on, inventions made jointly."64 As coinventor
of jointly made inventions, NASA will receive an undivided in-
58 SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 42.
59 Compare SHORT FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 47, 1 2, with NASA, INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-INVENTION AND PATENT RIGHTS (LONG FORM SAMPLE
CLAUSE) 2-7, in SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 81-82 [hereinafter LONG FORM
SAMPLE CLAUSE].
60 LONG FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59.
61 See id. 1 2 ("Upon request, NASA will use reasonable efforts to grant Partner,
under 37 C.F.R. § 404 (2011), a negotiated license to any NASA invention made
under this Agreement.").
62 37 C.F.R. § 404.5(a) (1) (2012).
63 NASA Technologies Available for Licensing, NASA (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.
nasa.gov/offices/oct/stp/communications/rsslicensing.html.
64 Id.; LONG FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 1 4.
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terest in the patent.6 5 Absent an agreement to the contrary, a
joint owner of a patent "may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the
patented invention . . . without the consent of and without ac-
counting to the other owners." 6 To alleviate concerns that
NASA will use its ownership interest to the detriment of the SAA
partner, provision 4 adds:
Upon timely request, NASA may, at its sole discretion and subject
to paragraph 5 of this clause:
(a) refrain from exercising its undivided interest inconsistently
with Partner's commercial business; or
(b) use reasonable efforts to grant Partner, under 37 C.F.R.
Part 404, an exclusive or partially exclusive negotiated
license.
While provision 4 appears to be pro-partner, qualifying for an
exclusive or partially exclusive license is more difficult than
qualifying for a nonexclusive license." In order for a domestic
company to obtain an exclusive license under provision 4(b),
the partner must comply with the six requirements of 37 C.F.R.
§ 404.7. SAA partners should carefully consider this provision
because it affects their ability to assert their patent rights against
infringers. Receiving an exclusive license may be an integral
part in establishing standing should the SAA partner subse-
quently bring patent infringement suits.
Jointly owned patents can lead to a host of standing issues.o
Generally, "[a]bsent the voluntary joinder of all co-owners of a
patent, a co-owner acting alone will lack standing."7 ' NASA may
decide that litigating an infringement claim would go against its
policy of commercializing space.7 2 NASA can frustrate the part-
ner's ability to sue infringers by refusing to voluntarily join the
65 See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1465 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (explaining the rule that each coinventor receives a pro rata undivided
interest in the patent).
66 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2006) (emphasis added).
67 LONG Fom SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 1 4.
68 Compare 37 C.F.R. § 404.6 (2012) (nonexclusive licenses), with id. § 404.7
(exclusive, co-exclusive, partially. exclusive).
69 Id.
7o Isr. Bio-Eng'g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1264-65 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (explaining the standing requirements for plaintiffs in patent infringe-
ment suits).
71 See id.
72 See Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(explaining that one co-owner can impede the other co-owner's ability to sue
infringers).
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patent infringement suit.73 Absent voluntary joinder, the SAA
partner will need to prove it owns a virtual assignment or be able
to join NASA as a Rule 19 plaintiff.7 4
Virtual assignment of a patent occurs when an "exclusive li-
cense transfers 'all substantial rights' in the patents."7 Unfortu-
nately, the Federal Circuit has been unclear on what rights
constitute "all substantial rights."'7 Nevertheless, courts gener-
ally consider the grantee's right to sublicense, the grantor's re-
version interest, the grantor's right to receive a portion of the
recovery, the duration of the exclusive license, and the limita-
tions on the grantee's ability to assign its interests.
Even if the partner receives a license from NASA, provision 5
reserves several rights for NASA and its related entities.78" "For
inventions made solely or jointly by NASA employees, NASA
reserves the irrevocable, royalty-free right of the U.S. Govern-
ment to practice the invention . . . ."" Provision 5 also grants
NASA the right to practice the invention or have another entity
practice the invention pursuant to "any existing or future
treaty."" Thus, provision 5 may negatively affect a court's char-
acterization of the exclusive license granted to the SAA partner
under provision 4. Additionally, a court may find these govern-
ment reservations inconsistent with the transfer of a virtual as-
signment, thus precluding the SAA partner from having
standing to unilaterally bring an infringement suit.
If NASA refuses to voluntarily join an infringement suit and
the partner lacks an exclusive license, the partner may attempt
to join NASA using Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." Under Rule 19, the court can make a party who refuses
to join the lawsuit an involuntary plaintiff.8 2 Yet without an ex-
73 See Isr. Bio-Eng'g Project, 475 F.3d at 1264.
74 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (stating that the court can make a party who refuses
to join the lawsuit an involuntary plaintiff).
75 Alfred E. Mann Found. for Scientific Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d
1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
76 See Timothy Denny Greene, "All Substantial Rights": Towards Sensible Patent
Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 1 (2012); see also Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d at
1360-61.
77 Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d at 1360-61; Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccan-
ica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is helpful to look
at what rights have been retained by the grantor, not only what was granted.").
78 LONG FoRM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 5.
79 Id. 5(a).
80 Id. 5.
81 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
82 Id. R. 19(a) (2).
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clusive license from NASA, courts may be reluctant to apply
Rule 19.83 The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that patent
co-owners must voluntarily consent to join as plaintiffs in a pat-
ent infringement suit.8
Without all substantial patent rights, the SAA partner remains
at the mercy of NASA."' To overcome these standing concerns,
the SAA partner should negotiate additional rights that accom-
pany the exclusive license, such as the exclusive right to sue in-
fringers. 6 While no such clause exists in any of the sample
patent clauses, SAA partners should consider the future stand-
ing implications of jointly owning a patent with NASA.
3. Disclosure of Reported Inventions
Provision 6 of the Long Form Sample Clause deals with the
public disclosure of information relating to SAA inventions:
"For inventions reported under this clause, the Receiving Party
shall withhold all invention reports or disclosures from public
access for a reasonable time (1 year unless otherwise agreed or
unless restricted longer herein) to facilitate establishment of
patent rights."" Disclosing an invention prior to filing a patent
application can have serious effects on an invention's patentabil-
ity. To complicate the issue, substantive changes made by the
AIA to the definition of what constitutes "prior art" may change
the way companies disclose their newly conceived inventions.
SAA provisions that were once favorable under the 1952 Patent
83 See Richard F. Cahaly, Note, At Each Other's Mercy: Do Courts Fairly Apply Rule
19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Protect Patent Co-Owners' Property Rights?, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 671, 681 (2001) (explaining that federal courts have exer-
cised limited use of Rule 19 when there is no exclusive license); see also Asym-
metRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(explaining one of the policy reasons for Rule 19 is to avoid multiple lawsuits or
prevent incomplete relief arising from the same subject matter).
84 See Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1467-68 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
85 See id. at 1468 (explaining that the congressional report stated that patent
co-owners will be "at the mercy of each other").
86 See AsymmetRx, 582 F.3d at 1319-20 (commenting that the exclusive right to
sue is "particularly dispositive" when deciding standing issues); see also Ethicon,
135 F.3d at 1468 (explaining that when co-owners grant each other the unilateral
right to sue, they waive their right to not join an infringement action); see also
Willingham v. Lawton, 555 F.2d 1340, 1344-46 (6th Cir. 1977) (stating that a co-
owner granting another co-owner "sole discretion" to bring suit will not be pro-
tected from such litigation if he later finds it detrimental to his interests).
87 LONG FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 1 6.
88 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(c) (2012).
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Act will take on new relevance as third-party disclosures and
traditional one-year grace periods change under the AIA.
For patent applications filed prior to March 16, 2013, the
USPTO assigns the patent application a priority date based on
the application's effective filing date." If the examiner rejects
the application based on prior art that is less than one year
older than the priority date, the applicant can "swear back" the
reference by proving to the USPTO that the invention was con-
ceived or reduced to practice before the prior art date.o This
ability created a hard one-year grace period." Thus, there was
little benefit in disclosing an invention prior to filing the appli-
cation under the 1952 Patent Act. Provision 6 embodies this rea-
soning; NASA gives the partner one year to file a patent
application before publically disclosing the invention." Prior to
March 16, 2013, once NASA published information regarding
the invention, the one-year grace period began." However, the
AIA fundamentally changes this thinking.9 4
For applications filed after March 16, 2013, the AIA replaces
the hard one-year grace period with a complex set of exceptions
to prior art disclosures.9 5 Because applicants can no longer rely
on their conception date for priority, they will not be able to
swear back prior art references. To alleviate this sudden depar-
ture from the traditional one-year grace period, Congress cre-
ated exceptions for inventor and non-inventor disclosures made
within one year of the application date.
Section 102(b) (1) (A) of the AIA creates an exception to the
prior art disclosure if, within one year before the effective filing
date of the invention, a "disclosure was made by the inventor or
joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter
89 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCE-
DURE § 706.02 (9th ed. 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf.
90 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (allowing the applicant to submit an appropriate oath
or declaration to establish invention of the subject matter of the rejected claim
prior to the effective date of the reference or activity on which the rejection is
based).
91 See Camille M. Barr, The Section 102 Grace Period Under the America Invents Act:
A Novel Source of Litigation, 4 LANDSLIDE 46, 46 (2012).
92 LONG FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 1 6.
93 Id.
94 Barr, supra note 91, at 46-47.
95 AIA § 3(b) (1) (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1)); see also Rob-
ert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the A1A, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1030
(2012).
96 AIA § 3(b) (1) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
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disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint in-
ventor."9 7 Thus, similar to the old § 102(a) provisions, if NASA
publishes information provided by the SAA partner regarding
solely or jointly made inventions, the disclosure will not be used
as prior art against a patent application filed within one year."
The second exception, AIA § 102(b) (1) (B), states that a dis-
closure made within one year of the filing date will not be prior
art if "the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure,
been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or
another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or
indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor."99 Simply put,
"[i]f an inventor does not publicly disclose before a third-party
disclosure, there is no grace period for that inventor." 00 This
second exception appears to greatly incentivize early invention
disclosure. Under the new law, it may be beneficial for NASA or
the partner to publicly disclose inventions sooner than one year.
SAA provisions that call for extended periods of nondisclosure,
like provision 6, may now work against an inventor.o'0 But con-
founding the issue is the USPTO's recent explanation of how it
plans to enforce § 102(b) (1) (B).1 02
The USPTO's final rules for enforcing intervening disclosures
focus on the particular subject matter of the intervening disclo-
sure.' The prior art status of a disclosure depends on whether
the subject matter of the disclosure was previously disclosed to
the public; the manner in which the disclosure occurred and
whether the disclosure was verbatim are not dispositive. 0o For
instance, if "the inventor or a joint inventor had publicly dis-
closed elements A, B, and C, and a subsequent intervening
grace period disclosure discloses elements A, B, C, and D, then
only element D of the intervening grace period disclosure is
available as prior art."' How the USPTO ultimately enforces
this exception will play a large role in whether an SAA partner
97 Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A)).
98 See id.
99 Id. (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1) (B)) (emphasis added).
100 Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the ALA, supra note 95, at 1031.
101 See LONG FoRM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 1.6.
102 See Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor to File Pro-
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should publicly disclose its invention prior to filing an
application.
Finally, SAA partners should consider the effect of NASA in-
vention disclosures on their foreign filing rights. Although the
United States has created a quasi-grace period in its first-to-file
system, other countries have not.'0 6 Lowering the one-year pro-
tection period of provision 6 may be beneficial for U.S. filings
but detrimental to patentability in foreign countries. Thus,
under the AIA, SAA partners will have to conduct a careful bal-
ancing act, weighing the benefits of U.S. disclosure with the re-
strictions that arise in foreign countries.
4. Patent Filing Responsibilities and Costs
Provision 7 of the Long Form Sample Clause requires that
patent applications based on joint inventions include the follow-
ing clause: "The invention described herein may be manufac-
tured and used by or for the U.S. Government for U.S.
Government purposes without the payment of royalties thereon
or therefore."' 7 Empirical evidence suggests that NASA is be-
coming a larger player in the space-technology patent market. 0
From 2003 to 2012, 1,194 patents were issued listing NASA as
having a government interest.109 Interestingly, NASA's involve-
ment in patenting space technology has not been uniform over
the past ten years." 0 From 2003 to 2009, the number of patents
listing NASA's government interest hovered between 90 and 115
per year."' But in 2010, 2011, and 2012, the USPTO issued 166
patents, 153 patents, and 157 patents, respectively." 2 Based on
106 Barr, supra note 91, at 46. For instance, the European Patent Office has a
limited six month grace period. See Convention on the Grant of European Pat-
ents (European Patent Convention) art. 55, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as
amended Nov. 20, 2000).
10 LONG FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 7(b).
108 A search of the USPTO Patent and Image database was performed using
the following terms: Term 1 - "NASA", Field 1 - "GOVT", Term 2 - "20030101-
>20121231", Field 2 - "ISD." USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE,




U1 Specifically, 2003: 116; 2004: 115; 2006: 100; 2007: 98; 2008: 95; 2009: 110.
See, e.g., USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE SEARCH, http://patft.
uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (For NASA patents in 20xx, search





this data, over the last decade, almost 40% of patents listing
NASA as having a government interest have been issued in just
the last three years."'
NASA's influence over companies commercializing space will
lead to more inventions being subject to NASA control. As a re-
sult, SAA partners using the Long Form Sample Clause need to
fully understand their patent and licensing rights as applied
both before and after March 16, 2013.
C. THE TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE
The Space Act grants NASA title-taking authority, meaning
"an invention shall be the exclusive property of the United
States if it is made in the performance of any work under any
contract of the Administration."" Thus, when work is for
NASA, the SAA will include the Title Taking Sample Clause.' 15
For SAA partners, this raises an important question-when is
work "for NASA"?
The SAA funding arrangement offers insight to the question
of whether NASA may take title."' Reimbursable SAAs require
the partner to pay NASA for work that will benefit the part-
ner.' It is unlikely that a reimbursable SAA would entitle NASA
to use the Title Taking Sample Clause."' On the other hand,
nonreimbursable SAAs usually involve both parties contributing
resources to achieve a mutually beneficial goal." 9 NASA has
stated that "[i]f research and development activities of the Part-
ner relate to a cooperative effort 'with NASA' rather than a di-
rected effort 'for NASA,' NASA's title taking authority does not
apply."1 2 0
In addition to any reimbursement arrangements, two other
considerations also affect whether the research and develop-
ment activity qualifies as a cooperative effort.'2 1 First, NASA
11 [(166 + 153 + 157) / 1194] * 100 = 39.86%.
114 SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 43; see National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958, 51 U.S.C. § 20135 (2006).
115 NASA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-INVENTION AND PATENT RIGHTS
(TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE), in SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 82-88 [hereinaf-
ter TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE]; see also SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 43.
116 SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, 12-14.
117 Id. at 12.
118 See id. at 43.
119 See Schuman, supra note 12, at 283 (explaining NASA's nonreimbursable
agreement with Bigelow Aerospace, LLC to develop inflatable space habitats).
120 SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 43 (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 43-44.
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looks to the partner's planned use of inventions made under the
SAA.12 2 If a partner's primary economic rationale for entering
into the SAA is to commercialize the technology in an existing
commercial market, then NASA will likely categorize the SAA as
a cooperative effort.12 3 If the primary rationale is to sell the in-
vention to NASA, then the SAA will be categorized as work for
NASA and subject to the Title Taking Sample Clause. 1 24
A second consideration is whether NASA is entering into the
SAA to further an identified mission requirement.12 1 If NASA is
entering into the nonreimbursable SAA with no clear intention
of using the developed technology for a specific agency require-
ment, then NASA should use either the Short or Long Form
Sample Clause. 1 2 6 Alternatively, if NASA enters into the SAA to
develop or update technology for a specific mission, then NASA
should use the Title Taking Sample Clause. 22
NASA utilizes funded SAAs "when Agency objectives cannot
be achieved through any other agreement instrument . . . or a
[r]eimbursable or [n]onreimbursable [SAA] ."128 Funded SAAs
will almost always cause the agreement to fall under NASA's ti-
tle-taking authority."1 2 Therefore, companies-including part-
ner subcontractors-entering into a funded SAA will be subject
to NASA's title-taking authority.1 3 0
1. Definitions
If NASA's title-taking authority applies, it is critical to under-
stand what inventions are subject to forfeiture under the SAA.
Within the definitions section of the Title Taking Sample
Clause, NASA defines the term "made" to mean "the conception
or first actual reduction to practice."13 1 The term is frequently
found within the phrase "inventions made under this agree-
ment" to grant a range of partner and NASA patent rights.13 2
For instance, provision 3(b) prevents NASA from claiming
122 Id. at 43.
123 Id. at 43-44.




128 See id. at 15.
129 Id. at 15, 44.
130 See id.
131 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 1(d).
132 See, e.g., id. It 2(b), 3(b), 6(a)(i).
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rights to inventions "not made under this Agreement."1 3 3 Be-
cause NASA has the exclusive right to any invention made under
the Title Taking Sample Clause,13 4 the definition of "made" is
perhaps the single most important definition affecting party
rights.
Several factors determine whether an invention is "made"
under the SAA: (1) whether the invention was conceived or ac-
tually reduced to practice during the SAA; (2) whether the in-
vention relates to the subject matter of the contract; and (3)
whether the invention is patentable under Title 35 of the United
States Code.'3 5 The Title Taking Sample Clause includes several
provisions to help the government in proving these elements.
First, to aid the government in proving conception, provision
5 requires the SAA partner to disclose inventions and maintain
lab notebooks or other records that would tend to prove con-
ception." 6 Alternatively, NASA can take title if the first actual
reduction to practice occurs under the SAA.' 3 ' But understand-
ing when the first actual reduction to practice occurs can be
difficult.
Reduction to practice can be either actual or constructive. 13
Constructive reduction occurs when a patent application is filed
on the invention."' Actual reduction occurs when the con-
ceived invention "work[s] for its intended purpose."i1o Impor-
tantly, no actual reduction to practice is required to file a patent
application.' 4 1 This distinction is important because the defini-
tion of "made" under the Title Taking Sample Clause only in-
cludes the first actual reduction to practice.14 2 Even if
conception and constructive reduction occur prior to the SAA, a
133 Id. 3(b).
134 Id.
135 Carl L. Vacketta & Oliver L. Holmes, Patent Rights Under Government Con-
tracts, 83-12 BRIEFING PAPERS 1, 2 (1983).
136 See TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 5(a) (requiring the SAA
partner to maintain lab notebooks or equivalent records).
117 Vacketta & Holmes, supra note 135, at 2.
138 Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 622 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that "the in-
ventor need not provide evidence of either conception or actual reduction to
practice when relying on content of the patent application").
142 See TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 1.
2013]1 669
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
first actual reduction to practice during the term of the SAA
may subject the invention to NASA's title-taking authority."'
The issue of an invention being "made under" a NASA con-
tract arose in Hummer v. Administrator of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.14 4 Hummer conceived of a spin scan
camera system for use on space vehicles.' 4 5 He tested his inven-
tion and filed a patent application on the device.' 4 6 This inven-
tion later became the basis of a contract with NASA."' However,
when Hummer originally reduced his spin camera to practice,
he tested it on a fixed platform; yet Hummer's patent claim re-
quired mounting the camera to a rotating body."'
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ruled that actual
reduction to practice requires that a device include every limita-
tion of its patent application claim."' Because Hummer failed
to mount the camera on a rotating body before entering into
the contract with NASA, the first actual reduction to practice
embodying every limitation of his patent claim occurred after
entering into the contract.5 o Based on the contract's definition
of "made"-which was the same as the definition used in the
Title Taking Sample Clause-NASA was entitled to the
invention.1 5 1
2. Allocation of Principal Rights
Provision 2 of the Title Taking Sample Clause outlines
NASA's right to take title, waive title, or license inventions made
under the SAA.152 Under the Title Taking Sample Clause, all
inventions made under the SAA are presumptively the exclusive
property of NASA.'
143 See Vacketta & Holmes, supra note 135, at 3.
I" Hummer v. Adm'r of the Nat'1 Aeronautics & Space Admin., 500 F.2d 1383,
1388 (C.C.P.A. 1974).




149 Id. at 1387; see also UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 652 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (actual reduction to practice of the invention must include a physical
embodiment which includes all limitations of the claim), overruled on other grounds
by Scaltech, Inc. v. Rectec/Tetra, L.L.C., 269 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
150 Hummer, 500 F.2d at 1387-88.
151 Id. at 1388.
152 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 2.
153 Id. 1 2(a) (i).
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NASA receives its authority to take title under 51 U.S.C.
§ 20135(b) (1).'"* An invention made for NASA will become the
exclusive property of the United States if the "person who made
the invention was employed or assigned to perform research,
development, or exploration work[,] and the invention is re-
lated to the work the person was employed or assigned to per-
form, or was within the scope of the person's employment
duties."'5 5 This is true even if the employee did not use govern-
ment facilities, funds, or proprietary information to make the
invention, or created it outside of work.15 6 Alternatively, title will
vest with NASA if the "person who made the invention was not
employed or assigned to perform research ... but the invention
is nevertheless related to the contract, or to the work or duties
the person was employed or assigned to perform, and was made
during working hours, or with a contribution from the
Government." 57
Although § 20135(b) (1) is expansive, provision 2 allows
NASA to waive rights to any inventions made under the SAA.'5 8
In accordance with the Presidential Memorandum on Govern-
ment Patent Policy of February 18, 1983, NASA will waive title to
inventions made under the SAA if (1) the "interests of the
United States and the general public will be better served"; or
(2) the SAA partner is, among other things, making a "substan-
tial contribution of funds, facilities [,] or equipment to the work
performed under the award."159 Following this directive, NASA's
Title Taking Sample Clause allowed the SAA partner to apply
for an advanced or individual waiver of inventions made under
the SAA. 6 0
There are several important caveats associated with waived in-
ventions. First, advanced waivers apply to domestic patent
rights. 61 Second, requesting an advanced, waiver must take
place before the SAA is signed or within thirty days after sign-
154 Id.
155 51 U.S.C. § 20135 (b) (1) (A) (2006).
156 Id.
158 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 2(c); see 51 U.S.C.
§ 20135(g).
159 Presidential Memorandum on Government Patent Policy, 1983 PuB. PAPERS
248, 252 (Feb. 18, 1983); 48 C.F.R. 27.302 (2012).
160 See TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 2(c); see also 14 C.F.R.
§§ 1245.103(b), 1245.105 (2013).
161 14 C.F.R. § 1245.104(a) (emphasis added).
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ing. 162 Third, the SAA partner is unlikely to receive a waiver if:
(1) it does not have a principal. place of business in the United
States, is not located in the United States, or is subject to foreign
control; (2) the government determines denial is necessary to
protect the security of the inventive activities; or (3) waiver
would hinder the technology's commercialization.16
If NASA denies the advanced waiver or the partner fails to
request a waiver within the appropriate time, individual waivers
are still available on an invention-by-invention basis.1 64 The re-
quirements for receiving an individual waiver are less onerous
than advanced waivers but still require applying within a limited
window. 6 ' Provision 2(c) (ii) of the Title Taking Sample Clause
states that the partner has eight months-the statutory maxi-
mum-after disclosing the invention to file a waiver request.16
And unlike advanced waivers, which require conformity with 14
C.F.R. § 1245.104(b)(1)-(3), individual waivers only require
conformity with 14 C.F.R. § 1245.104(b) (3).67 Finally, even if
NASA grants a waiver, the government still receives an irrevoca-
ble, royalty-free license.'16
3. Invention Disclosures and Reports
Provision 5 details the internal and external invention report-
ing procedures required of SAA partners.'6 9 These disclosure re-
quirements are important, and failure to comply with them can
lead to a forfeiture of inventions, loss of invention rights, loss of
waiver rights, and revocation of licenses.170
Within six months of conception or reduction to practice, the
SAA partner must internally report the inventive activity.' 7 ' The
partner must report inventive activity to NASA within the earlier
162 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 2(c) (ii); 14 C.F.R.
§ 1245.104(b).
163 14 C.F.R. § 1245.104(b)(1)-(3).
164 See id. § 1245.105.
165 See id.
166 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 2(c)(ii); 14 C.F.R.
§ 1245.105 (b) (1).
167 14 C.F.R. § 1245.105.
168 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 3(a) (i). This also ensures
that the government has a property interest in all inventions made under NASA's
title-taking authority. Id.
169 Id. 5(a).
170 14 C.F.R. § 1245.104(c) (2); TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115,
4(a) (explaining that a license is granted "unless Partner fails to disclose the in-
vention within the time limits in paragraph 5(b) of this clause").
171 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 5(a).
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of two months if documented internally in writing, or six
months once made aware of the inventive activity. 1 7 2 Addition-
ally, every twelve months, the partner must send NASA a report
listing the inventions made during that period.17 3 A final report
is due within three months after the SAA terminates and must
list all the inventions made during the SAA or certify that there
were none.17 4
Companies, universities, or organizations unfamiliar with gov-
ernment reporting may find NASA's reporting processes more
stringent than their own.17 1 Changing administrative policy can
also create administrative hardships. For instance, the Invention
Management Procedures at the University of North Carolina
merely suggest broad timeframes when invention disclosure
ranges from "very good" to "very poor."'7 Even if a company is
able to implement the required disclosure rules, entering into
contracts with multiple government agencies will subject the
company to disparate disclosure requirements. 7 7
Exasperating this issue is the lack of any extension provision
for inadvertent disclosure violations.17 8 Simply negotiating the
inclusion of FAR 52.227-11 (c) (4) creates a process for remedy-
ing inadvertent omissions and alleviating the harsh penalties as-
sociated with nondisclosure.7 9
4. Subcontracts and Other Agreements
Provision 7 of the Title Taking Sample Clause details the con-
tractual clauses NASA requires the SAA partner to include in
agreements with subcontractors.18 0 The same Title Taking Sam-
ple Clause used between NASA and the partner must also be




175 See Kuyath, supra note 30, at 14 (noting that strict FAR disclosure guidelines
often conflict with a commercial company's standard reporting process).
176 Invention Management Procedures, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL (Feb. 3,
2009), http://otd.unc.edu/patent-copyright-procedures.php.
177 FAR disclosure requirements-used in standard government procurement
contracts-require invention disclosure within two months after the inventor no-
tifies the partner of the invention in writing. While this is similar to provision 5 of
the Title Taking Sample Clause, NASA requires earlier disclosure if the partner
even knew about the invention. Compare 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-11(c) (1) (2012), with
TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 5(b).
178 See TITLE TAMNG SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 5.
179 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-11(c) (4).
180 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 7.
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contractor.'8 1 Additionally, the partner "shall not require any
Related Entity to assign its rights in inventions made under this
Agreement to [the] Partner as consideration for awarding a sub-
contract."182 The partner may only acquire rights to inventions
made under the SAA that are necessary "to obtain [ ] and main-
tain [ ] private support. "183
5. March-In Rights
Provision 9 of the Title Taking Sample Clause defines NASA's
march-in rights.18 4 "March-in rights allow the government to
'march in' and take over an invention if commercialization of
[the] invention is not being executed with due diligence.. .."18
March-in rights thus stand in stark contrast to the traditional
patent grant, which permits the patent holder to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the invention."" While NASA has
never initiated a march-in proceeding,' it nevertheless values
the authority because "it helps ensure that federally sponsored
research results are commercialized."1 8 8
Provision 9's march-in rights require the SAA partner to grant
a responsible applicant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or ex-
clusive license to its patent.' NASA can grant the license itself
if "practical application" of the invention is not accomplished
within a reasonable time."'o While NASA defines "practical ap-
plication" to mean that "the invention is being used, and [that]
181 Id. 7(d).
182 Id.
183 Id. I 7(e) (i).
184 Id. 1 9. March-in rights are a cross-over from the Bayh-Dole Act. Rarely were
march-in provisions used before the implementation of Bayh-Dole. SeeJohn H.
Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing-A New Twist for March-In
Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 149,
154 (2005).
185 In re Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 516 F.3d 1003, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (em-
phasis in original).
186 Compare id., with 35 U.S.C § 154 (2006); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (4) (stat-
ing that a patent owner will not be denied relief for infringement based on pat-
ent misuse if the misuse is for not licensing or using the patent).
187 In re Roche, 516 F.3d at 1008.
188 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-742, INFORMATION ON THE
GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO ASSERT OWNERSHIP CONTROL OVER FEDERALLY FUNDED
INVENTIONS (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
189 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 9.
190 Id. The other march-in rights are violated if: (1) the public use require-
ments established by federal regulations have not been satisfied; (2) the inven-
tion is not being substantially manufactured in the United States; or (3) health or
safety needs are not being reasonably satisfied by the Partner. See id.
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its benefits are publicly available on reasonable terms," what
constitutes reasonable terms is left unclear."'
The National Institute of Health (NIH) is the only agency that
has received petitions to execute its march-in rights.19 2 Petitions
relying on a perceived abuse of the reasonable terms require-
ment may argue that the patentee has failed to implement rea-
sonable market prices or reasonably license its patent." For
instance, the American Medical Students Association argued
that marching in on a patented anti-AIDS medication would be
proper because the patentee was charging U.S. consumers
higher prices than consumers in other high-income coun-
tries.194 Third parties can also use march-in provisions as a litiga-
tion tool. 95 In 1995, Johns Hopkins University sued CellPro,
Inc. for patent infringement of an invention made under an
NIH grant.'9 6 CellPro attempted to circumvent trial proceedings
by petitioning the NIH to use its march-in rights and grant Cell-
Pro a license to Johns Hopkins's patent.'
While these attempts to obtain a patent license through
march-in procedures have not been successful,' several
changes to the negotiated Title Taking Sample Clause indicate
that NASA may be taking these march-in rights more seriously.
Therefore, partners with patents encumbered by expanded
march-in rights should carefully weigh their options when refus-
ing to license their patents.
19, See TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1(e).
192 See GAO REPORT, supra note 188, at 9 (stating that in the last twenty years,
neither the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, nor NASA has re-
ceived information that would allow them to initiate a march-in proceeding,
while the NIH has received several petitions).
193 See Meredith Wadman, NIH Asked to Grant Open License on HIV Drug, NA-
TURE.COM (Nov. 2, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/11/
nih-asked-to-grant-open-license-on-hiv-drug.html (discussing how the phrases
"reasonable terms" and "practical application" apply to march-in proceedings).
194 KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, REQUEST FOR MARCH-IN ON ABBOTT PATENTS
FOR RITONAVIR 9 (Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/
files/2012_Oct25_Ritionavirmarchincomplaint.pdf.
195 See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
196 Id.; see Mary Eberle, Comment, March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public
Access to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 155, 159, 163
(1999).
197 See Eberle, supra note 196, at 164 (explaining that CellPro petitioned the
NIH to march-in eight days before the second jury's verdict).
198 See GAO REPORT, supra note 188, at 9.
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Although the foregoing discussion on the Short Form, Long
Form, and Title Taking Sample Clauses was not exhaustive, it
covered an array of potential issues that SAA partners may en-
counter. Importantly, these are only the sample clauses; how pri-
vate companies negotiate to amend these clauses is equally
illustrative of NASA's role in commercializing space.
III. DEVIATIONS FROM THE SAMPLE PATENT CLAUSES
The SAA Guide helps NASA maintain uniformity amongst
SAAs created by the various NASA centers.'99 However, because
the Space Act allows for flexibility in the allocation of intellec-
tual property rights, these clauses may change to fit the needs of
a partner's particular circumstances. 2 0 0 The negotiated changes
help illustrate the concerns contracting parties have regarding
their intellectual property rights.
A. DEVIATIONS FROM THE LONG FoRm SAMPLE CLAUSE
In 2008, NASA entered into an SAA with Ad Astra Rocket
Company to facilitate and conduct test flights of Ad Astra's pre-
viously developed VASIMRTM propulsion engine.2 0 ' Because this
was primarily a service contract and the work was not for NASA,
the SAA used the Long Form Sample Clause. 20 2
However, the negotiated SAA with Ad Astra included several
changes to the sample clause. 2 03 First, the clause was amended
such that NASA must use "reasonable efforts to grant AD AS-
TRA ... a license on terms to be subsequently negotiated to any
such invention on which NASA has acquired title and decides to
file a patent application."2 04 This language differs from the sample
patent clause, which entitled Ad Astra to a license for any inven-
tion that NASA had acquired title to. 2 05 Second, the negotiated
SAA amended the Protection of Reported Inventions provi-
199 Supra Part I; see generally SAA GUIDE, supra note 30.
200 SAA GUIDE, supra note 30, at 32.
201 See NASA & AD ASTRA ROCKET Co., NONREIMBURSABLE SPACE ACT AGREE-
MENT art. 2 (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter AD ASTRA SAA] (stating that the purpose of
the agreement is to conduct space test flights of the VASIMR engine).
202 Compare AD ASTRA SAA, supra note 201, at 14-17, with LONG FORM SAMPLE
CLAUSE, supra note 59.
203 Id.
204 An ASTRA SAA, supra note 201, art. 11.3 (emphasis added).
205 LONG FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 1 3.
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* 2061nta C~~lsion. Instead of withholding inventive activity from the public
for one year, NASA will withhold information for two years.20 7
B. DEVIATIONS FROM THE TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE
The Title Taking Sample Clause assumes new form under the
three recent Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS) SAAs and five Commercial Crew Development
(CCDev) SAAs detailed below. The stated objectives of the
COTS and CCDev SAAs are to: (1) "stimulate commercial enter-
prises in space"; (2) establish "cost effective access to low-Earth
orbit" facilitated by private industry; and (3) create a new mar-
ket for commercial space transportation that will be available to
government and private sector customers. 208 Due to the nature
of the agreements-work done for NASA-both the COTS and
CCDev SAAs use the Title Taking Sample Clause.2 0 9
The negotiated SAAs included several uniform changes and
several contract-specific changes. These differences may be in-
structive as to which patent rights NASA is willing to negotiate
on an agreement-to-agreement basis and which changes are
universal.
1. Removal of Domestic Manufacturing Requirements
All eight SAAs removed the requirement to manufacture in-
ventions in the United States. 21 o This change included removal
of provision 8, "Preference for United States manufacture," as
well as the associated march-in provision.2 1 ' While this change
may provide economic benefits for companies that manufacture
products outside of the United States, changes to the geo-
206 Compare AD ASTRA SAA, supra note 201, art. 11(6), with LONG FORM SAMPLE
CLAUSE, supra note 59, 1 6.
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., SPACE ACT AGREEMENT No. NJO6TA26S BETWEEN NATIONAL AERO-
NAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AND SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES
CORP. FOR COMMERCIAL ORBITAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICES DEMONSTRATION
(COTS) (2006), available at http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/189228
mainsetc nnj06ta26a.pdf [hereinafter SPACEX COTS SAA].
209 See, e.g., SPACE Acr AGREEMENT No. NNJ10TA02S BETWEEN NATIONAL AERO-
NAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AND BLUE ORIGIN, LLC FOR COMMERCIAL
CREW DEVELOPMENT (CCDEV) (2010), available at http://www.nasa.gov/centers/
johnson/pdf/471971mainNNJ10TAO2S blue-originSAAR.pdf.
210 Compare TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 1(g), with SPACEX
COTS SAA, supra note 208, art. 13.
211 Compare TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 1(g), with SPACEX
COTS SAA, supra note 208, art. 13.
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graphic restrictions affecting patent novelty will require exami-
nation of those benefits.
The 1952 Patent Act placed geographic restrictions on several
types of novelty-defeating prior art.2 12 Only if the invention was
"known or used by others in this country" or "in public use or on
sale in this country" would the activity preclude patentability.2 13
However, the AIA has removed these geographic restrictions. 214
According to the new law, if the invention is "described in a
printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise avail-
able to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention," the actions may prevent patentability.215 Therefore,
while partners may have the freedom to manufacture through-
out the world, they should be cognizant that certain actions,
even if they occur outside the United States, may prevent
patentability.
2. Changes to the Allocation of Principal Rights
The most notable change to the negotiated SAAs is NASA's
intention to waive its title-taking authority. Provision 14.B(3) (b)
of Boeing's CCDev SAA is representative:
Wavier of Rights[-] NASA has determined that to stimulate and
support the capability of a United States commercial provider to
provide commercial crew space transportation services to the
public and the Federal Government, the interest of the United
States would be served by waiving to Boeing, in accordance with
provisions of 14 C.F.R. Part 1245, Subpart 1, rights to inventions
made by Boeing in the performance of work under this
Agreement.216
Nevertheless, this is merely a statement of intention; partners
still have to comply with the advanced waiver or individual
waiver procedures to secure title to their inventions.1
Although NASA intends to waive its title-taking authority, the
SAAs offer little guidance on how to exempt specific technolo-
212 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
213 Id. § 102(a), (b) (emphasis added).
214 Compare AIA § 3(b)(1) (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)),
with 1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (2006).
215 AIA § 3(b)(1) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)).
216 SPACE ACT AGREEMENT No. NNJ10TA07S BETWEEN NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AND THE BOEING COMPANY FOR COMMERCIAL CREW DE-
VELOPMENT (CCDEV) (2010), available at http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/
pdf/475893main NNJ10TA07SBoeingSAA-R new.pdf [hereinafter BOEING
CCDEv SAA].
217 See id. art. 14.B.1.b.
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gies. For example, SpaceX's SAA states that NASA will not ob-
tain rights in pre-existing inventions provided that the SAA
includes a suitable restrictive notice.2 18 Alternatively, Orbital's
SAA clearly states that "NASA obtains no right in pre-existing
Inventions, except for Inventions made under this Agree-
ment."2 19 Furthermore, Orbital insulated its previously devel-
oped technology from the SAA's provisions with the following
statement: "For the avoidance of doubt, any inventions made in
the development of Taurus II shall not be considered inventions
made under this Agreement." 2 2 0 Thus, Orbital's Taurus II tech-
nology is exempted from the SAA provisions.
This additional provision is instructive for commercial compa-
nies wanting to explicitly remove certain technologies from
NASA's title-taking authority. Once a technology is subject to
the Title Taking Sample Clause, there are myriad ways NASA
can use its licensing or title-taking rights to affect a company's
intellectual property.
3. Changes to the Government's Minimal Rights
All eight of the reviewed SAAs amend the government's mini-
mum rights to inventions made under the SAA." These
changes balance NASA's interest in commercializing space with
providing an incentive for the private development of
technology.
In the negotiated SAAs, NASA includes two incentives for the
expedient completion of milestones.2 23 First, NASA will not ex-
ercise its irrevocable, royalty-free license during the term of the
SAA.22 4 Second, once all milestones are completed, NASA will
refrain from exercising its irrevocable license "for a period of
five (5) years following the expiration of th[e] Agreement or
until December 31, 2015, whichever is later."2 2 1 Interestingly,
218 SPACEX COTS SAA, supra note 208, art. 13.
219 SPACE ACT AGREEMENT No. NNJO8TA32S BETWEEN NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AND ORBITAL CORPORATION FOR COMMERCIAL ORBITAL
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES DEMONSTRATION (COTS) (2008), available at http://
www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/214893mainOrbitalCOTSPhlRe-
dacted SAA 2_27_08.pdf [hereinafter ORBITAL COTS SAA].
220 Id. art. 13.B.1.a.
221 See id.
222 Compare TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 3, with BOEING
CCDEv SAA, supra note 216, art. 14.C.
223 See, e.g., ORBITAL COTS SAA, supra note 219, art. 13.C.
224 Id. art. 13.C.2.
225 See, e.g., id. art. 13.C.3.
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this time period was not uniform amongst the examined SAAs.
SpaceX negotiated this time period to terminate on December
31, 2020,226 while Kistler Aerospace Corporation negotiated the
time period to last until December 31, 2020, or ten years follow-
ing the expiration of the agreement, whichever is later.
These provisions strike a balance between NASA's interest in
commercializing space and the realization that exclusive rights
drive innovation.2 2 8 If a partner can achieve its milestones, provi-
sions 13.C.2 and C.3 may prevent NASA from using its govern-
ment license for a significant portion of an invention's patent
term. 2' This incentivizes completion of SAA goals while al-
lowing companies to benefit from the exclusive patent grant.
4. Changes to the Rights of Subcontractors and Related Entities
In the negotiated SAAs, NASA makes an important distinction
between inventions made by the SAA partner and inventions
made by related entities of the SAA partner. Although NASA
waives title to inventions made by the SAA partner, NASA does
not extend this promise to subcontractors.2 3 0 The negotiated
SAA requires that subcontracts replace the intention-to-waive
provision with the Title Taking Sample Clause.23 1 Furthermore,
unlike the sample clause provisions, the SAA partner may now
require the subcontractor to assign its rights in inventions as a
contractual obligation.2 3 2
226 SPACEX COTS SAA, supra note 208, art. 13.C.3.
227 SPACE ACT AGREEMENT No. NNJO6TA27S BETWEEN NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AND KISTLER AEROSPACE CORPORATION AND ROCKET-
PLANE LIMITED, INC. FOR COMMERCIAL ORBITAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICEs DEMON-
STRATION (COTS) (2006), available at http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/
pdf/189226mainkistler nnj06ta27s.pdf [hereinafter KISTLER COTS SAA].
228 See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Per-
spectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 803, 806 (1988) (stating the premise that
patents create an incentive to innovate).
229 See, e.g., ORBITAL COTS SAA, supra note 219; SPACEX COTS SAA, supra note
208; KISTLER COTS SAA, supra note 227.
230 See, e.g., BOEING CCDEV SAA, supra note 216, art. 14.G.1.
231 See, e.g., id. art. 14.G.1.b; TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, [
2(c) (ii).
232 Compare TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 7(d), with BOEING
CCDEv SAA, supra note 216, art. 14.G.
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5. Broadening the Scope of Government March-In Rights
The government has expanded NASA's march-in ability in
each of the eight negotiated SAAs."3 In addition to the original
march-in rights (excluding the domestic manufacturing require-
ments), NASA may now march in if the SAA partner has: (1)
"achieved practical application of such invention, [but] has
failed to maintain practical application of such invention in
such field of use"; or (2) "discontinued making the benefits of
such invention available to the public or to the Federal Govern-
ment."23 4 This expansion of power raises several concerns.
SAA partners may be without procedural safeguards should
NASA enforce its march-in provisions. The Bayh-Dole Act gov-
erns traditional government-funded contracts allowing agency
march-in."6 Agencies must follow specific federal regulations if
they wish to assert their march-in rights.2 3 6 These procedures
cover notification requirements, evidentiary proceedings, and
the judicial appeals process. 23 7 But NASA's march-in rights ema-
nate from its "other transaction" authority, not the Bayh-Dole
Act.238 NASA has already established its propensity to act outside
of FAR procedures;2" it follows that NASA may refuse to follow
established march-in procedures. Therefore, partners should
negotiate for the inclusion of express procedural safeguards,
such as FAR 27.304.1(g).
In addition to the procedural issues, marching in will have
considerable technological and economic repercussions. The
GAO has cautioned that marching in could have a chilling effect
on private investment and jeopardize the establishment of tech-
nological know-how. 24 0 This may be particularly troublesome for
the diffusion of space industry knowledge, as NASA has histori-
cally been one of the few entities with a space program. Further-
233 Compare TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 9, with ORBiTAL
COTS SAA, supra note 219, art. 13.H.
234 ORBiTAL COTS SAA, supra note 219, art. 13.H.1.b-c.
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 208 (2006).
236 Id. § 203(b); see also 48 C.F.R. § 27.304-1(g) (2012) ("When exercising
march-in rights, agencies shall follow the procedures set forth in 37 C.F.R. [§]
401.6.").
237 See 37 C.F.R. § 401.6 (2012); see GAO REPORT, supra note 188, at 6 (explain-
ing the thirty-day notice requirement and what information may be submitted).
238 See Kuyath, supra note 30, at 16-17.
239 See Exploration Partners, LLC, 19298804, 2006 WL 3734150, at *1 (Comp.
Gen. Dec. 19, 2006).
240 See GAO REPORT, supra note 188, at 14-17 (explaining four key disincen-
tives that prevent federal agencies from using Bayh-Dole march-in authority).
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more, NASA's additional march-in rights impact the free
market's effect on space technology. Allowing NASA to march
in if the SAA partner achieved practical application of the inven-
tion but discontinued such use may overlook the free market's
influence on a technology's commercial feasibility. 241 NASA
should temper its desire to commercialize space with the realiza-
tion that commercial companies are well suited to evaluate the
feasibility of new technologies.2 4 2
Ultimately, amendments to the sample SAA provisions offer
both parties a chance to protect their monetary and technologi-
cal investments. SAA partners should carefully inspect amend-
ments to the sample provisions made by NASA, as these changes
alter the partner's rights to the inventions created under the
SAA. Furthermore, SAA partners should consider the tangential
intellectual property issues that SAAs create.
IV. RELATED CONTRACTING CONCERNS
As Parts II and III discussed, NASA has become proactive in
the patenting and licensing of space technology. NASA has lib-
erally granted waivers to patent inventions while retaining prop-
erty rights in the form of irrevocable licenses. 4 NASA relies on
SAAs to cover myriad patent issues, but these contractual provi-
sions expose companies to additional intellectual property
'concerns.2 4 4
Under the current SAA provisions, companies have a ques-
tionable ability to choose their own intellectual property protec-
tions. Even if a company desires patent protection, the
government's march-in rights may limit the manner in which
companies commercialize their patents. Additionally, the combi-
nation of space technology and NASA's retained property inter-
est expose inventions to increased security scrutiny. Companies
should consider the noncontractual implications that arise when
working with NASA.
241 See Commercializing Space: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space and Aeronautics
of the H. Comm. on Science, 106th Cong. 4 (2000), available at http://www.rff.org/
RFF/Documents/RFF-CTst-00-macauley-Julyl8.pdf (statement of Dr. Molly K
Macauley, Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future).
242 See George Landrith, SpaceX: Solydra in Space, BREITBART (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/08/24/Solyndra-in-Space
(discussing the free-market approach to space exploration with the undertones
that SpaceX may be the next Solyndra).
243 Supra Parts II-111.
244 Supra Parts II-III.
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A. AUTONOMY IN CHOOSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The CEO of SpaceX recently made headlines by stating: "We
have essentially no patents in SpaceX. Our primary long-term
competition is in China-if we published patents, it would be
farcical, because the Chinese would just use them as a recipe
book."2 4 5 A search for patents owned by SpaceX returns just a
single patent,24 6 supporting the implication that SpaceX has
chosen trade secret protection over patent law. Despite this deci-
sion, SpaceX's SAA will dictate the type of protection it may ob-
tain.2 4 7 Yet the AIA may have created a loophole for companies
to retain trade secret protection while also fulfilling their con-
tractual obligations.
There are several reasons why a company may wish to use
trade secrets. As SpaceX and others have articulated, enforcing
patent rights to space technology is difficult.248 Furthermore,
unlike patents, which have a term of twenty years,2 4 9 the life of a
trade secret is potentially indefinite.25" This distinction is espe-
cially important in the space industry, where startup costs are
significant and space vehicle commissions last for decades.2 ' Fi-
nally, patent applications must disclose the "best mode contem-
245 Elon Musk-CEO and Chief Designer, SPACEX (2013), http://www.spacex.
com/elon-musk.php; Chris Anderson, Elon Musk's Mission to Mars, WIRED (Oct.
21, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/10/ff-elon-musk-
qa/all/.
246 See USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE SEARCH, http://patft.
uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (Term 1: "SpaceX"; Field 1: As-
signee Name; Term 2: "Space Exploration Technologies"; Field 2: Assignee
Name; Boolean Operator should be OR).
247 All three SAA patent clauses require the partner to obtain patent protec-
tion. The Short Form Sample Clause requires that for jointly made inventions,
"[t]ihe [p]arties will consult and agree on the responsibilities and actions to estab-
lish and maintain patent protection for joint invention[s]." SHORT FORM SAMPLE
CLAUSE, supra note 47, 1 2 (emphasis added). The Long Form states that
"[p]arties will use reasonable efforts to report, and cooperate in obtaining patent protec-
tion on, inventions made jointly." LONG FORM SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 59, 1 4
(emphasis added). The Title Taking Clause requires that the "[p]artner shall
execute all papers necessary to file patent applications and establish the Govern-
ment's rights." TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 5(d).
248 See Ro et al., supra note 6, at 224.
24 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (2006).
250 Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Ap-
proach, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 207, 237 (2008) (explaining
that trade secrets are distinguished from patents and copyrights in that they are
not subject to any time limitation).
251 NASA's Space Shuttle Endeavor completed twenty-five missions in almost
twenty years, while the Space Shuttle Atlantis completed thirty-three missions
during almost twenty-six years of operation. See Space Shuttle Launches, NASA (July
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plated by the inventor for carrying out his invention."52
Patentees are not permitted to disclose the "second-best embod-
iment" of their invention "while retaining the best for [them-
selves]."2" Yet recent changes by the AIA to the best mode
requirement may have opened the door for companies to re-
ceive both patent and trade secret protection.2 5 4
Under the 1952 Patent Act, a defendant to a patent infringe-
ment suit could invalidate a patent by showing that the patentee
failed to disclose the best mode of practicing the invention.5
The AIA amended this requirement by providing that the best
mode requirement is no longer a means to invalidate a patent
during litigation.25 6 This leaves the USPTO as the sole enforcer
of the best mode requirement; yet even the USPTO has con-
ceded that "[i]t is extremely rare that a best mode rejection
properly would be made in ex parte prosecution."2 5 7
In most states, trade secret protection is obtainable for "'in-
formation ... that ... derives independent economic value ...
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertain-
able by proper means by, other persons who can obtain eco-
nomic value from its disclosure or use."'25 8 Disclosing the
preferred embodiment of an invention will likely prevent con-
current trade secret and patent protection.2 5 9 While the AIA
may allow for both trade secret protection and patent protec-
tion, overcoming an SAA's disclosure provisions may be a
greater barrier to trade secret protection.
Assuming NASA has waived its title-taking authority, the SAA
partner must file a patent application on inventions made under
the SAA and disclose all inventive activity to NASA.2 0 Once dis-
closed, NASA only withholds the information from the public
25, 2011), http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/537939main_ss-launches-080311.pdf (de-
tailing the missions of each of NASA's five Space Shuttles from 1981 until 2011).
252 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Kuyath, supra note 30, at 13.
253 In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled on other grounds by
In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 946 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
254 Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 1, 3-4 (2012).
255 35 U.S.C. § 282.
256 AIA § 15(a) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282).
257 MUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2165.03 (8th ed. 2012); see also
Love & Seaman, supra note 254, at 12-13.
258 Love & Seaman, supra note 254, at 6 (quoting the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act § 1(4)(i) (1985)) (emphasis added).
259 Id.
260 TITLE TAKING SAMPLE CLAUSE, supra note 115, 1 5.
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for a reasonable time so that the SAA partner can establish its
patent rights.26 1 Once NASA discloses the invention, trade secret
protection is likely unobtainable. Yet there is no requirement
for the SAA partner to disclose the best mode to NASA; the SAA
only requires that "[i]nvention disclosures shall . . . be suffi-
ciently complete in technical detail to convey a clear under-
standing of the nature, purpose, operation, and physical,
chemical, biological, or electrical characteristics of the inven-
tion."2 6 2 Although. the SAA leaves the door open for partners to
retain the best embodiment of their invention,6 3 withholding
inventive activity from NASA is fraught with peril. Specifically,
failure to disclose inventive activity may entitle NASA to revoke a
partner's minimum rights in the invention.2 6 4
B. SECRECY ORDERS FOR SPACE TECHNOLOGY
As discussed above, a search for patents owned by SpaceX re-
turns only a single patent, patent number 7,503,511 ('511 pat-
ent).26 5 SpaceX filed an application for the '511 patent on
August 4, 2005, claiming priority to a provisional application
filed on September 8, 2004.266 The application published on
January 8, 2009, and issued on March 17, 2009.267 This timeline
is notable because it is the policy of the USPTO that "each appli-
cation for a patent shall be published . . . promptly after the
expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date
for which a benefit is sought under this title."2 6 8 Under this pol-
icy, SpaceX's application should have published in March 2006.
This delay highlights another issue commercial space compa-
nies must deal with-secrecy orders.
After SpaceX filed its patent application, the USPTO Licens-
ing and Review Board flagged it for a third-level security review,




264 Id.; see also Campbell Plastics Eng'g & Mfg., Inc. v. Brownlee, 389 F.3d 1243,
1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (ruling that strict compliance with disclosure provisions
is required and piecemeal invention disclosure may violate disclosure
requirements).
265 USPTO PATENT FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE SEARCH, supra note 246;
U.S. Patent No. 7,503,511 (filed Aug. 4, 2005).
266 U.S. Patent No. 7,503,511, at [22], [60] (filed Aug. 4, 2005).
267 Id. at [45], [65].
268 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 257, § 1120; 35
U.S.C. § 122 (2006).
2013] 685
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
(DOD)."6 ' More than three years later, on September 4, 2008,
the DOD cleared the patent application for publication.2 7 0 Only
then did the USPTO give the application a publication date, as
it had recently "been cleared by Licensing & Review or a secrecy
order has been rescinded."2 7 1
At the end of 2012, there were 5,321 patents currently subject
to secrecy orders.2 7 2 Non-DOD agencies-which include NASA
and the Department of Energy-filed more secrecy orders in
2011 than in any of the previous twelve years.2 73 Private compa-
nies should consider how secrecy orders-combined with
NASA's increased participation in the patenting of inventions-
may affect their patent rights. Even if an invention is not subject
to a secrecy order, the screening process may take several years,
thereby delaying the patent's issuance.
The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 authorizes the Commis-
sioner of Patents to make available to designated defense agen-
cies for inspection any patent applications that "might . . . be
detrimental to the national security."2 7 5 If the government has a
property interest in the invention, a secrecy order will issue if
the application's publication "might . . . be detrimental to the
national security."2 76 Alternatively, if the government lacks a
property interest in the invention, then a secrecy order will only
269 Transaction History, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://portal.uspto.
gov/pair/PublicPair (search patent number "7503511"; click Transaction His-
tory) (last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
270 See Department of Defense Access Acknowledgement/Secrecy Order Recommendation
for Patent Application, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., (Sept. 4, 2008), http://
portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (search patent number "7503511"; click Image
File Wrapper; click "any document coming from L and R").
271 Notice of New or Revised Projected Publication Date, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFF., http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair (search patent number "7503511";
click Image File Wrapper; click "Notice of New or Revised Publication Date")
(last visited Sept. 25, 2013).
272 Letter from Kathryn Siehndel, USPTO FOIA Officer, Office of General
Law, to Steven Aftergood, Fed'n of Am. Scientists (Oct. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/stats.pdf (outlining the use of se-
crecy orders from 1988 to 2012).
273 Id.
274 See, e.g., Department of Defense Access Acknowledgement/Secrecy Order Recommen-
dation for Patent Application, supra note 270; see also The Secrecy Order Program in the
United States Patent & Trademark Office, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (June 27, 1991),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/program.html.
275 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
276 Id. (emphasis added).
[ 78686
COMMERCIALIZING SPACE
issue if publication "would be detrimental to the national
security." 277
The Space Act defines what NASA considers to be detrimental
to national security: "No patent may be issued to any applicant
other than the Administrator for any invention which appears
... to have significant utility in the conduct of aeronautical and
space activities . . . ."27 Additionally, the DOD will withhold
from the public "any technical data with military or space appli-
cation in the possession of . .. the [DOD], if such data may not
be exported lawfully" outside the United States.2 7 9 In addition to
these criteria, Congress has recently considered expanding the
use of secrecy orders to inventions that might harm the nation's
economic security.2 0
If a secrecy order issues, its duration will depend on several
factors. Generally, unless the United States is at war or the Presi-
dent has declared a national emergency, a secrecy order will last
for twelve months and is renewable indefinitely.28 1 Improper dis-
closure of the invention will result in abandonment of the pat-
ent application, forfeiture of any claims against the United
States resulting from the secrecy order, monetary penalties, and
potential prison time. 8 Once the secrecy order issues, a com-
pany may have difficulty commercializing its invention. 2 83
Under the SAA patent clauses, inventions jointly made or in-
ventions subject to the Title Taking Sample Clause entitle NASA
to, at a minimum, a government purpose license. Because the
government will have a property interest, the invention is sub-
ject to the lower "might" standard for secrecy order protection.
Furthermore, if adopted, secrecy orders for economically signifi-
277 Id. (emphasis added); see also Thomas L. Kundert, Invention Secrecy Guide:
Foreign Filling Licenses, Secrecy Orders and Export of Technical Data in Patent Applica-
tions, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 667, 670 (2006).
278 51 U.S.C. § 20135(d) (2006).
279 32 C.F.R. § 250.4(a) (2012); see also Kundert, supra note 277, at 669.
280 Notice of Request for Comments on the Feasibility of Placing Economically
Significant Patents Under a Secrecy Order and the Need to Review Criteria Used
in Determining Secrecy Orders Related to National Security, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,662,
23,663 (Apr. 20, 2012).
281 See 35 U.S.C. § 181. If the United States is at war, then the secrecy order will
last until hostilities end, plus one year. See id. If the secrecy order issues during a
presidentially declared national emergency, then the order lasts for the duration
of the emergency plus six months. Id.
282 35 U.S.C. §§ 182, 186.
4 283 See Sabing H. Lee, Protecting the Private Inventor Under the Peacetime Provisions
of the Invention Secrecy Act, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 345, 364 (1997) (discussing what
the inventor of a patent subject to a secrecy order can do under the order).
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cant patents would likely encompass cutting-edge space technol-
ogy. Thus, even if NASA waives title to an invention made under
an SAA, securing patent protection is not a foregone
conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The private space industry is currently in a symbiotic relation-
ship with NASA. NASA funds the development and advance-
ment of space technology while private companies help NASA
achieve its administrative obligations. Over time, private compa-
nies will become less dependent on NASA as they develop indus-
try know-how, build patent portfolios, and develop testing
facilities. Until this happens, SAAs will allow NASA to exercise
considerable power in the emerging space industry.
SAAs give NASA power in the negotiation process and consid-
erable control over inventions made under the agreements. Re-
cent changes to U.S. patent law require that NASA and
commercial companies reevaluate their contracted-for patent
rights. As the United States transitions to the AIA, provisions
contracted for under the 1952 Patent Act will require
reconsideration.
Companies contracting with NASA will also want to consider
the noncontractual implications of using SAAs. SAAs limit the
intellectual property protections companies may use and expose
new technologies to secrecy orders that may adversely affect the
subsequent commercialization of new inventions.
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